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Abstract:  As public concern for food safety burgeons concerned policy makers search for ways
to manage the risk inherent to food consumption.  Product liability laws may serve as efficient
means to induce socially optimal levels of care or may efficiently complement regulation of
potentially injurious activities.  However, two characteristics common to many food borne illness
cases are often not considered in the standard liability economics model that yields these
prescriptions: dose-response damage functions and victim damage prevention.
This paper explores how dose-response relationships common to the biology and
epidemiology of food borne illness may effect the shape of resulting social welfare functions and
privately chosen prevention efforts under different liability rules when both processor and
consumer affect damages.  Dose-response damage functions yield social objectives with multiple
local optima that may dictate diametrically opposite policy prescriptions in terms of prevention
sharing between consumer and processor.  Small changes in the relative efficacy of either party's
preventative effort may dictate discrete changes in the socially optimal prescription.  Similarly,
legal rules that fail to recognize both parties' contribution to damage (e.g., strict processor or
consumer liability) or incorrectly define due care standards for processor negligence or
contributory negligence may cause private decisions to differ discretely from socially optimal
behavior.1
As public concern regarding food borne illness has burgeoned over the past decade
concerned policy makers have been searching for ways to manage the pathogen-based
risk inherent to food consumption.  High profile events, such as the death of a young
child and the severe illness of more than 70 others associated with the consumption of
Odwalla apple cider containing E. coli O157:H7 in October of 1996, have helped to
capture the public's attention and to increase their knowledge of food borne pathogens.
The 1998 FDA Food Safety Survey quantifies this perception: 40 percent of US
consumers believe food poisoning has become more common in the past five years and
the percent of consumers who believe microbial organisms (e.g., E. coli) are a serious
food safety problem has increased from 36 to 52 percent since 1993.
Food processing companies are also on the alert; high profile incidents cost
companies millions of dollars in regulatory fines, tort liabilities and decreased product
sales.  The Odwalla case alone yielded a $1.5 million government fine (Consumer
Product Litigation Reporter, 1998) and tort settlements greater than $12 million (Liability
Week, 1998).
Economists have long recognized that product liability laws may serve as efficient
means to induce socially optimal levels of care by potential injurers (Posner 1992) or may
efficiently complement regulation of potentially injurious activity (Shavell 1984; Kolstad
et al. 1990).  However, much of this literature fails to incorporate two characteristics
common to many food borne illness cases.
The first characteristic is that of a dose-response damage function.  Most literature
assumes that costly preventative effort is related to human damages via a convex function
- initial efforts reduce damages considerably while the cost of total damage elimination2
approaches infinity. When damages are dictated by biological responses, as is the case in
tracing the survival of harmful pathogens under different preventative effort treatments
and tracing the decline of human health to increasing pathogen ingestion, the pertinent
physical relationships often conform to a dose-response relationship that fails to meet
these strict convexity assumptions.  In dose-response relationships, increasing effort
reduces damage first at a decreasing rate, then -- near the point of inflection -- at an
increasing rate, and finally, once again at a decreasing rate.
The second characteristic pertinent to food borne illness that is somewhat
underrepresented in the more general accident literature is that of bilateral control of the
injurious activity, or as Shogren and Crocker (1991, 1999) call it, endogenous risk.  For
most food borne illness caused in the home, consumers have means available to alter the
probability and severity of potential damages.  While such bilateral settings are addressed
by some of the product liability and tort economics literature (see Shavell (1980) and
Posner (1992) for complete discussion of bilateral accidents and tort law under
neoclassical assumptions and Shogren and Crocker (1991, 1999) for welfare
measurement implications of endogenous risk), the interaction of victim prevention with
other extensions of the standard neoclassical accident model have been minimal.
 The purpose of this paper is to explore how dose-response relationships common to
the biology and epidemiology of food borne illness may effect the shape of resulting
social welfare functions and the effects of different liability rules on private choices of
preventative effort by processor and consumer.  The paper proceeds as follows.  First, the
mechanics of the dose-response damage function are developed and several possible
functional forms are enumerated.  Next, socially optimal levels of processor and3
consumer preventative effort are derived.  Then a simple numerical example is described
and solved for both the social optimal and for optimal private actions under several
liability rules; this is done for the several damage functions.  The efficacy of various tort
rules and the characteristics of privately chosen effort levels under various damage
functions is then discussed.
II. Model
Consider a model that consists of a processing sector and a consumer sector.  The
processor manufactures one unit of food and chooses Q ˛[0, Qmax], the amount of effort
to exert to prevent microbial infestation of its food.  The consumer sector consumes all
food and chooses e ˛[0, emax],  the amount of preventative effort exerted during the
food's transport, storage and preparation to reduce microbial infestation or impede its
growth.
  Microbial Growth and Food Borne Illness
Let q be the microbial density of food (e.g., log Colony Forming Units (CFU) per ml)
at the time of consumption and assume  ) , ( e Q f q = , where additional preventative effort
decreases final microbial density when exerted by either the processor (fQ < 0) or the
consumer (fe < 0).  Microbial density is assumed to affect consumer well being because it
increases the probability of food borne illness, z and increases the damage associated with
the onset of such illnesses, D.  Call the product of illness probability and illness damage
the expected damage function, d = zD = d(Q, e).  Damage may cause market losses
(productivity, time, medical expense) as well as non-market losses (pain and anxiety); d
represents the expected monetarized value of all losses.4
It is assumed for the remainder that expected damages are monotonically decreasing
in both processor and consumer effort (dQ < 0, de < 0).  However, several different forms
of the expected damage function are considered:
(A1) d is globally convex (dee > 0, dQQ > 0, deedQQ - (deQ)
2 > 0); e.g.,
2 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Q e Q e Q e a d Q e eQ Q e
c g g a a a + + + + + =
where  x ~ = (xmax - wx x) > 0 for x ˛ [e, Q]; emax and Qmax are the maximum amount of
consumer and processor preventative effort possible; the wx's are parameters dictating the
relative efficacy of the two types of effort; the ax's are weighting constants and a = -
deQQmaxemaxwewQ.
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where dmax is the maximum damage level and k is a positive constant associated with the
function's inflection point.  Consider two sets of assumptions for this functional form:
(A2) aeQ = 0, aj and gj > 0 for j = e, Q
(A3) aeQ > 0, aj and gj = 0 for j = e, Q
Examples of functions that meet all three sets of assumptions are pictured in Figure 1.
Function (A1) meets all neoclassical expectations; it is monotonically decreasing in
both arguments and globally convex.  The dose-response functions are also
monotonically decreasing but not globally convex.  Under assumptions (A2) the function
is quasi-convex; hence the iso-damage curves are convex to the origin and the elasticity
of substitution is globally positive as in (A1).  Under (A3) quasi-convexity does not hold,5
iso-damage curves are concave to the origin and the elasticity of substitution is globally
negative.
The quadratic dose-response function is chosen because it is a common functional
choice in microbiological and epidemiological studies.  While such sigmoidal functions
often have only scalar arguments (e.g., food borne pathogen growth modeled as a
response to a single, controlled factor), efforts to expand the functional form to several
factors (called secondary level modeling in this literature) are often implemented by
substituting a polynomial expansion of several factors in place of the scalar argument.
For example, Buchanan et al. (1993) fit experimentally controlled levels of temperature,
salinity and pH to the growth rate of E. coli O157:H7 in several foods using a quadratic
expansion of these arguments nested within a Gompertz function.  While the Gompertz
differs from the logistic form chosen in this paper, the elasticity of substitution between
salinity and temperature, holding pH constant, is negative for many values of salinity,
temperature and pH used in the Buchanan et al. study (1993).
The Consumer Sector
The consumer sector consists of a risk-neutral, representative consumer who
maximizes:
) , ( ) ( 0 e Q d L p e B w w - + - - =
where  w is consumer wealth,  w0 is initial consumer wealth; B(e) is the consumer's
monetarized effort cost (Be > 0 and Bee > 0); p is food price; and L is the liability payment
from processor to consumer as determined by the tort system.  It is assumed that the
consumer and processor hold unbiased expectations for the expected damages.
The Processing Sector6
Following  Shavell (1980) there is assumed to be one processor who acts
competitively (hence zero expected profits).  This processor chooses preventative effort
to maximize profit:
L Q c p - - = ) ( p
where c(Q) is the processors’ cost function with cQ, cQQ > 0 and L is the expected penalty
to be paid by the processor.
Social Optimum
The socially optimal consumer and processor preventative efforts are defined as those
that maximize consumer wealth while minimizing consumer and processor effort cost
and expected damages:
(1)  ) , ( ) ( ) ( max 0
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First-order optimality conditions for interior solutions are:
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Socially optimal preventative consumer effort (eq. 2) occurs when the consumer's
marginal effort cost equals the expected marginal damage reduction from increased
preventative effort.  Optimal processor effort (eq. 3) requires the marginal effort costs to
equal marginal expected damage improvements.  Combining the two requirements will
direct us to look for the tangency between the marginal rate of substitution (Be/cQ) and
the marginal rate of technical substitution (de/dQ).  Second-order sufficiency conditions
are met under (A1), but may not hold under (A2) and (A3) due to the lack of global
convexity of the damage function.  Hence, global optimality of the first-order conditions
must be checked via alternative means; a global maximum is assumed to exist.7
III.  Social Optimum vs. Private Solutions with Torts: A Numerical Example
Consider the following example with consumer effort cost of B(e) = e
2; processor
effort cost of c(Q) = Q
2 and expected damages under the three sets of assumptions (A1-
A3) outlined above and pictured in Figure 1.  All damage functions involve Qmax=emax=5
and ae = aQ = ge = gQ = 1.  The convex damage function (A1) in this example assumes
aeQ = -0.2 and we = wQ = 1.  For (A2) aeQ = 0 while for (A3) aeQ = 1.   For the examples
of (A2) and (A3) it is assumed that dmax = 50, wQ = 0.95, we = 1.05 and k = 5.
Social Optimum
The social objective functions subject to the three sets of assumptions for the damage
function are pictured in Figure 2.  When expected damages are convex, the social
objective is unimodal and concave; the optimal solution requires that both consumer and
processor contribute preventative effort in the mid-range of possible levels (Q1
* = 2.41,
e1
* = 3.16) where the superscript stars denote socially optimal levels and subscript one
denotes the set of assumptions for the damage function are given by (A1).  Marginal
changes in the relative efficacy or relative cost of one party's effort yield marginal
changes in the optimal sharing of preventative effort.
When the function is a QDR under (A2), the social objective exhibits two local
optima.  The global optimum requires substantial preventative effort from both parties
(Q2
* = 4.00, e2
* = 3.78) while the secondary local optimum involves no effort from either
party (Q2
' = 0, e2
' = 0).
Which local optimum is the global solution depends upon total damages relative to
total preventative costs summed across consumer and producer.  If either or both types of
preventative costs become large relative to damages, the social optimum tends toward8
zero effort from both; otherwise the social optimum tends toward high effort by both
parties.  Local optimum that occur away from the origin under (A2) are typically interior;
hence social optimality dictates some sharing of the burden and cost of preventative
effort between the parties as in the case of convex damage functions.  This optimal
sharing emerges because the damage  isoquants under (A2) are convex to the origin;
hence tangencies with the social iso-cost curves, which are concave to the origin, occur in
the interior of the feasible effort region.
When the function is a quadratic dose-response (QDR) function under assumptions
(A3), the social objective function also exhibits two local optima, though they are
diametrical to the two local optima generated by assumptions (A2) (note the Figure 2b
features a rotation of the axis relative to the other two figures).  Comparing these we find
the global optimum (Q3
* = 0.315,  e3
* = 4.41) which features heavy reliance upon
consumer effort and little processor effort.  This result is driven, in part, by the
assumption that consumer effort is more effective than processor effort in limiting
damages (we > wQ).  However, note that the other local optimum (Q3
' = 4.786, e3
' = 0.54)
features heavy reliance on processor effort and limited reliance on consumer effort -
exactly opposite to the relative effort levels at the global optimum.
The QDR as under (A3) has a negative elasticity of substitution between consumer
and processor effort.  In order to maintain a constant level of damage, one needs to
substitute an increasing amount of the consumer effort for every unit of processor effort
that is not provided.  Hence, corner solutions are likely to be the norm rather than the
exception.  In other words, because the damage isoquants bow out from the origin as do
the social  iso-cost curves, points of tangency and local optima tend toward a corner9
solution rather than an interior solution.  Hence small changes in relative efficacy (which
could be spurred by new technology) or relative marginal cost of preventative effort
(which could be spurred by small changes in relative input prices) could lead to large
changes in the socially optimal solution.  As explored below, changes in liability rules
can also lead to discrete changes in processor and consumer effort levels.
Strict Processor Liability
In the case of strict processor liability, an ex-post payment is made from processor to
consumer in the amount of damages suffered regardless of the effort exerted by either
party.  Hence, consumer's effort under strict liability (e
L) is zero regardless of the form of
the expected damage  function because all damages are absorbed by the processor.
Knowing this, processors choose effort to minimize production costs and damages.
Under (A1), processors choose marginally less effort than is socially optimal (Q1
L =
2.25 < Q1
* = 2.41) where the sign of the inequality stems from the negative cross-partial
derivative of the expected damage function (aeQ = -0.2).  The marginal effectiveness of
processor effort in terms of reducing expected damages increases as consumer effort is
withdrawn.  Because each unit of effort is more effective at reducing expected damages
less is chosen when it is the only means of damage reduction.
Under (A2) strict liability leads the processor to choose a much lower level of effort
than is socially optimal (Q2
L = 0 = Q2
' < Q2
* = 4.00).   In this case when the consumer
does not add any effort and the elasticity of substitution between consumer and processor
effort is positive and processor costs are increasing at an increasing rate, a sub-optimal
level is chosen by the processor.  The processor chooses to pay the consumer the amount
of damages and exert no preventative effort because processor effort is complementary to10
consumer effort.  Processor liability removes all incentives for consumer prevention,
hence driving both privately chosen effort levels to the secondary social optimal at the
origin.
Under (A3) and strict liability the processor chooses a level of effort that exceeds the
socially optimal level (Q3
L = 4.86 >  Q3
'
   >  Q3
* = 0.32).  Because the consumer is
compensated for all damages and, due to bimodal nature associated with the dose-
response form under (A3), the processor chooses a much higher level of effort.  The
negative elasticity of substitution between consumer and processor effort suggests joint
efforts to reduce damage are replaced with solitary efforts with little additional effort on
the part of the remaining party.  Because consumers have no motive to provide effort
under processor liability and because damages remain high compared to the costs
absorbed by processor's preventative effort, processors choose to provide high effort.
Processor Negligence and Processor Liability with Consumer Contributory
Negligence
Under processor negligence damages are absorbed by the consumer unless the
processor's level of effort drops below the due care standard, in which case the processor
absorbs all damages.  When the due care standard is chosen such that it equals the
socially optimal level of processor care relevant to each example, processors maximize
profits by choosing the socially optimal level of care in all three examples.  Given that
processors act optimally, consumer optimal reactions in all three examples are to also
choose effort at the socially optimal level.  Even in the examples where the social
objective function is not concave and bimodal, processor negligence induces socially
optimal responses by both parties.11
Under processor liability with a defense of consumer contributory negligence, the
processor is held strictly liable for all consumer damages unless the consumer fails to
exert due care (the consumer contributes to damage by being negligent), in which case
the consumer absorbs all damages.  When the consumer's due care standard is chosen to
equal the socially optimal level, both the processor and the consumer maximize their
individual objectives by choosing the socially optimal levels of effort in all three
examples.
Even in the examples which feature dose-response damage functions, the tort
arrangements of processor negligence and processor liability with a defense of
contributory negligence yield socially optimal outcomes when due care standards are set
equal to socially optimal levels of effort.  Both sets of tort rules share the following
feature: one party absorbs full liability for damages if it doesn't meet a due care standard
and otherwise it absorbs no liability costs.  Given that two social goals are present
(regulating consumer and processor effort), two policy instruments are needed (Miceli
and Segerson 1995).  Assignment of liability to one party provides one of the needed
instruments; if used alone it does not yield socially optimal results.  Reassignment of
liability if a due care standard is not met, such as is the case under processor negligence
and a defense of contributory negligence, provides the second needed instrument which,
if calibrated correctly, can yield socially optimal results.
Correct  ex ante  assignment of these standards of care and accurate  ex post
interpretation and evidentiary discover of the effort exerted by each party can be critical
to social efficiency of tort arrangements (Endres 1989).  Further research of the
interaction of dose-response relationships with improper assignment or assessment of12
standards is warranted.  Such improper assignment or interpretation may yield similar
discrete changes from optimal outcomes as those associated with private decisions under
strict processor liability and strict consumer liability.
III.  Conclusions
Dose-response relationships between preventative effort and human damage and the
shared effort of consumer and processor often required to limit pathogen-based risk in
home prepared meals yield a regulatory problem that deviates from the standard problem
explored in the liability economics literature.  The dose-response damage functions
common to pathogen-based production relationships may translate to social objectives
with multiple local optima that dictate diametrically opposite policy prescriptions in
terms of the sharing of preventative effort between consumer and processor.  Small
changes in relative efficacy of each party's preventative effort or small changes in the
relative costs of preventative efforts may dictate large changes in the socially optimal
prescription.  Similarly, legal rules that fail to recognize both parties' contribution to
damage (e.g., strict processor or consumer liability) or incorrectly define due care
standards, may cause private decisions to differ discretely from socially optimal behavior.
Properly understanding food safety issues in the context of the emerging regulatory
and liability environment will require enriching the modeling structure beyond the initial
steps taken by this paper.  Consumer perception of risk, probability of identifying and
litigating food borne illness cases, the degree of market power held by processors and the
interaction between ex post liability and ex ante regulation are all features pertinent to
optimal social prescriptions for dealing with food safety issues.  Furthermore, properly
estimating the technological linkages from preventative effort to pathogen growth to13
human health effect to consumer damage is a major challenge that lies ahead for
economic and physical scientists.14
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